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CITY TOLLS – ONE ELEMENT
OF AN EFFECTIVE POLICY
COCKTAIL*
RICHARD ARNOTT**
For almost fifty years, following William Vickrey’s
lead (1959, 1963), urban transport economists have
been advocating congestion pricing as the way of
dealing with urban auto congestion.1 Their advocacy
was based on the standard analysis of the Pigouvian
internalization of an externality. Drivers impose an
external congestion cost on other drivers by slowing
them down. If this congestion cost is internalized by
means of a Pigouvian tax/congestion toll,then traffic
congestion will be at the right level. Vickrey’s origi-
nal (1959) proposal was to equip each car with a
transponder that would send a signal to roadside
receptors, which would be relayed to a central com-
puter.The computer would record the driver’s move-
ments, calculate the congestion externality cost
imposed by him in his travels and bill him for this
amount.
This congestion pricing scheme was criticized on
many grounds: it would compromise privacy; by
making people pay with money rather than with
time, it would hurt the poor; it would be impractical
and excessively costly to administer; and it would be
political poison since it would make people pay for a
commodity – public road space – that had previous-
ly been provided free of charge, and would be
regarded as a tax grab. For many years, congestion
pricing was simply dismissed by policy makers.That
was phase I.
In phase II, a number of changes occurred. Urban
transport economists, acknowledging the validity of
many of the criticisms of Vickrey-type schemes,
modified their congestion pricing proposals. Privacy
issues would be dealt with through the use of pre-
paid smart cards; concerns about equity and a tax
grab would be addressed by transparently redistrib-
uting toll revenues in a way that would benefit all
major stakeholders (Small (1992,1993));and conges-
tion pricing would be applied more coarsely,through
cordon pricing or through charging for travel on only
urban freeways and highway, for example.
Policy makers, meanwhile, were getting increasingly
frustrated by the failure of standard policies – build-
ing more roads and later encouraging mass transit –
to stop the seemingly inexorable worsening of traffic
congestion.2 The results of Hong Kong’s congestion-
pricing experiment and the increasingly refined con-
gestion-pricing schemes employed in Singapore
were widely discussed; they demonstrated that dri-
vers do respond predictably to congestion prices and
that congestion pricing is technologically feasible
and can be implemented at reasonable cost. There
was also political momentum to privatize transport
systems, which for highways requires road pricing.
By the end of phase II, many freeways around the
world had more or less sophisticated tolling struc-
tures. Singapore had a generally successful cordon
pricing scheme in place,several Norwegian cities had
implemented cordon tolls, and a number of jurisdic-
tions (Hong Kong, Cambridge, Berkeley, the Ran-
staad area of the Netherlands, and Stockholm) had
given serious consideration to the implementation of
congestion pricing but had backed down in the face
of political opposition.
* Many of the themes in this article are found in Chapter 1 of
Alleviating Urban Traffic Congestion (2005).This notwithstanding,
my co-authors on that book,Tilmann Rave and Ronnie Schöb,may
not share the opinions I express in this article.I would like to thank
Robin Lindsey and Ronnie Schöb for providing comments on an
earlier draft, and Robin Lindsey for updating me on the literature.
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1 This is of course an exaggeration. Urban transport economists
instead say, “Get the prices right through congestion pricing, and
other elements of urban transport policy will be easy to optimize.”
If all prices are right, then urban land use will be efficient, and
infrastructure will be chosen efficiently if the intuitive, first-best
investment rules are followed. As a bonus, if as is argued in foot-
note 4 urban auto transportation is characterized by increasing
long-run average cost, then the revenue raised from the optimal
tolls will be more than enough to finance optimal capacity
(Mohring and Harwitz (1962), Strotz (1965) and Arnott and Kraus
(1998)).
2 For US metropolitan areas,the steady rise in congestion levels has
been documented by the Texas Transportation Institute (The “2005
Urban Mobility Report” is available at http://mobility.tamu.edu/
ums/report/).The Institute measures the degree of urban auto con-
gestion by the number of hours of vehicle delay in rush-hour traf-
fic per year experienced by the average driver. For other countries
(except perhaps the United Kingdom) the steady rise in congestion
levels is not well documented but is asserted by almost all experts.The highly visible London area pricing experiment
has been more successful than almost all the
experts had predicted. It has succeeded in substan-
tially reducing the level of auto congestion in cen-
tral London, without a marked increase in conges-
tion on the Inner Ring Road just outside the con-
gestion charging zone. And unexpectedly, by sub-
stantially reducing travel time variability on city
streets, the modal shift has been from car to bus.
The success of the London experiment has prompt-
ed many cities around the world to initiate a con-
gestion pricing planning process.We are now enter-
ing phase III, in which urban auto congestion
tolling is being widely discussed in policy circles
and may come to be implemented on a widespread
basis.The topicality of urban auto congestion pric-
ing is the primary reason for the focus of this issue
of the journal on “City Tolls”.
This article has three aims.The first is to summarily
review the economic theory of congestion tolling as
background for this and other articles in the issue.
The second is to sound a cautionary and somewhat
heretical note: Look before you leap; the net bene-
fits from urban auto congestion tolling may not be
as considerable as its ardent supporters claim. The
third is to urge urban transport economists to move
beyond their preoccupation with urban auto con-
gestion pricing and to become more active in bring-
ing economics to bear on the wide range of com-
plementary policies that could be effective in alle-
viating urban traffic congestion.
The economic theory of congestion pricing
The Figure presents the standard diagram for the eco-
nomic analysis of traffic congestion. The analysis is
done in price-quantity space, where p is the full price
of a trip, including money costs, time costs and where
applicable the toll, and q is the number or flow rate of
trips.Capacity is taken to be fixed;the analysis is there-
fore short run.The demand function plots the quantity
of trips demanded as a function of price, D(p). There
are two relevant cost functions. The first, sometimes
termed the user cost function and sometimes the mar-
ginal private cost function, relates the private cost of a
trip to the flow on the road; congestion increases as
flow increases, increasing trip time and user cost. User
cost (uc) in excess of free-flow user cost is termed pri-
vate congestion cost (pcc).The second is the marginal
social cost (msc),which gives the social cost of an extra
trip as a function of flow.This equals the user cost plus
the congestion externality cost (cec) – the cost a driver
imposes on others by slowing them down.
In the absence of congestion pricing, the equilibrium
occurs at that flow level, qe, for which marginal private
cost equals trip price – where the marginal private cost
curve intersects the demand curve.The optimum how-
ever occurs at that level of flow, q*, for which marginal
social cost equals marginal social benefit. On the
assumption that marginal social benefit equals private
willingness to pay, the optimum is given by the point of
intersection of the demand curve and the marginal so-
cial cost curve. Imposing a congestion toll equal to
the congestion externality cost, evaluated at the op-
timum, τ*, causes the trip
cost function to shift up
such that it intersects the
demand curve at the opti-
mal flow level. The reve-
nue from the optimal toll is
shown as the cross-hatched
area. At a particular flow
level, marginal deadweight
loss, the increase in dead-
weight loss from an addi-
tional driver,equals margin-
al social cost minus margin-
al social benefit at that level
of flow. The total dead-
weight loss from imposing
no congestion toll,shown as
the solidly shaded area in
the Figure, equals the inte-
gral of marginal deadweight
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loss from the optimal to the equilibrium level of flow.
Capacity expansion results in a downward shift of both
the user cost and marginal social cost curves.
Some cautionary notes
In this section,I explain why I am more restrained in
my advocacy of urban congestion tolling than most
other urban transport economists.
The efficiency gains from even first-best congestion
tolling may not be large
When we think about traffic congestion, our instinctive
reaction is to think about all the time miserably wasted
in traffic, and how great the benefits would be if this
time could be substantially reduced. But this is not
thinking like a well-trained economist. Traffic conges-
tion is so high because of the spatial concentration of
economic activity in cities. Everyone benefits from this
spatial concentration through new and more varied
products, lower prices for many consumer goods and
higher economic growth,and city residents additionally
through higher wages, ready access to experts, urban
amenities and a richer set of social contacts.Traffic con-
gestion is simply one of the costs we pay to enjoy these
benefits. It is excessive congestion that should be our
principal concern. Due to underpriced auto travel, traf-
fic congestion is indeed excessive. Efficient congestion
pricing would therefore reduce the amount of time
wasted in traffic, but its implementation might not
reduce congestion by much or result in sizeable effi-
ciency gains or slow down the growth in congestion.3
As the diagram is drawn,the efficiency gains from con-
gestion tolling are only a modest fraction of the toll rev-
enues collected.By redrawing the Figure,it can be seen
that the gains are increasing in the demand elasticity
for rush-hour auto trips and the elasticity of private
congestion cost with respect to traffic density. Em-
pirical evidence suggests that the former elasticity is
low,4 while the magnitude of the latter is subject to con-
siderable disagreement (Arnott, Rave and Schöb 2005,
Ch. 5). Because the basic model ignores many margins
of travel choice (of which the timing of trips is proba-
bly the most important (Arnott, de Palma and Lindsey
(1990 or 1993)), as well as the endogeneity of urban
spatial structure, its application may result in consider-
able underestimation of the efficiency gains from first-
best congestion tolling, but we simply do not know.
The costs of implementation may be substantial
In the design of any congestion pricing scheme,there
is a tradeoff between the fineness of the scheme and
implementation costs. At one extreme are schemes
similar to the one originally envisioned by Vickrey
that attempt to charge the driver his marginal con-
gestion externality cost at each point in time, taking
into account his time and route of travel, and even
actual traffic conditions. Such schemes are typically
technology intensive, with high fixed costs, and can
be intrusive and expensive to administer,though Sin-
gapore’s electronic road pricing scheme and the re-
sponsive pricing on Interstate 15 in California have
been cost effective.At close to the other extreme is a
time-invariant cordon toll. Such a tolling scheme
would be effective in reducing the amount of traffic
crossing the cordon but would do nothing to encour-
age efficient driving behavior inside or outside the
cordon,or efficient trip timing,and would cause traf-
fic to divert around the cordon, perhaps to such an
extent that overall congestion would increase.5
What proportion of the potential efficiency gains
(those that would be achieved with perfect
Pigouvian tolling and no administrative costs) would
be achieved under various practical tolling schemes?
Even when the potential efficiency gains are size-
able, the actual gains that can be achieved might be
small or even negative.6 The theoretical models
3 The introduction of congestion tolling will result in a one-time
reduction in congestion,after which congestion will likely continue
to grow. Since centrally located urban land, the most important
input into urban road construction, is in fixed supply, urban auto
travel is likely characterized by increasing long-run average cost
(Small 1999).The continuing trend towards increased urbanization
and larger cities caused by technological changes in both produc-
tion and consumption has given rise to a steady increase in the
derived demand for urban auto trips and typically, too, in average
trip cost and congestion. (Gordon, Kumar and Richardson 1989,
1990 point to a possible counterexample – that despite rapid
growth, average commuting times in Los Angeles did not increase
over a twenty-year period because of changes in urban spatial
structure deriving from job growth in exurban areas.) 
4 The elasticity of rush-hour auto travel has probably been rising.
First, an increasing proportion of the workforce has flexible work
hours, allowing travel away from the peak. Second, an increasing
proportion of rush-hour trips are non-commuting trips, for which
the demand elasticity is higher.
5 Apparently this phenomenon occurred when Singapore first
installed cordon pricing around the central city (Chin 2002; Santos,
Li and Koh 2004).
6 There is quite a large academic literature that calculates, for both
simple theoretical models and more realistic computer simulation
models, the proportion of the potential efficiency gains that would
be achieved under various coarse tolling schemes. This literature
has considered tolling only a subset of roads – urban freeways and
highways but not city streets (Verhoef,Nijkamp and Rietveld 1996;
Mohring 1999), constraining the variation of tolls over time and
space (Chu 1999; Mohring 1999), varying cordon placement (May,
Liu, Shepherd and Sumalee 2000), and pricing on the basis of
expected travel time,actual travel time and distance traveled (May
and Milne 2004)). Taken as a whole, the literature has generated
two valuable insights.First,ignoring implementation costs,the ben-
efits of a congestion pricing program are sensitive to its details.
Second, in evaluating benefits, it is important to treat driver het-
erogeneity (Small and Yan 2001;Verhoef and Small 2004).
There has also been extensive discussion and analysis of the effica-
cy of the gas tax in alleviating urban traffic congestion.ignore the costs of developing and applying the tech-
nology to implement congestion pricing, and then of
administering and enforcing the program. These
costs can easily exceed the efficiency benefits
achieved with practical congestion pricing schemes.
One issue that deserves special mention is the choice
of technology.High technology systems,which tend to
be advocated by engineers, are expensive to imple-
ment and rapidly become outdated; low technology
systems are more flexible and easier to implement,
but enforcement and administrative costs tend to be
higher once the system is in place.7The London exper-
iment provides an interesting case study. On one
hand, the experiment has been more successful than
most of the experts expected (Shafer and Santos
2004).On the other,careful ex post cost-benefit analy-
sis (Prud’homme and Bocarejo 2005),employing stan-
dard methodology, suggests that the program’s net
benefits lie in the range of small to negative, princi-
pally due to unexpectedly high administrative and
enforcement costs.8 Some proportion of these costs
should be amortized since they have the character of
fixed costs, while another proportion is offset by the
social benefit from learning from London’s mistakes.
Even taking these factors into account, and despite
the high overall quality of the experiment’s design,the
net benefits are not large, however.
The political barriers to implementation are high
Congestion pricing programs were for many years
regarded as political poison. Modern programs are
designed to deal with many of the objections raised
against the earlier programs. Nevertheless, the polit-
ical attractiveness of congestion pricing remains
open to question.The politics of the London scheme
were, if not unique, at least particular to very large
cities. Crudely put, the scheme has suburbanite car
drivers pay for improvements to central city resi-
dents’ mass transit. Since it is the central city resi-
dents who vote, it is not surprising that the experi-
ment has been politically successful. In many other
cities, the political calculus is not as favorable – as
evidenced by the recent rejection by referendum of
a double cordon scheme in Edinburgh.
Congestion pricing may exacerbate other distortions
The theory of the second best tells us that it is often
desirable to distort a price in market A to offset a
distorted price in market B.One of the earliest appli-
cations of this principle was in the context of urban
transportation (Lévy-Lambert 1968). Setting the
mass transit fare below the congestion externality
cost imposed by a passenger offsets the distortion
associated with underpriced auto congestion.
Commuters divert from car to mass transit, with the
reduction in the deadweight loss associated with
underpriced auto congestion more than offsetting
the deadweight loss generated by underpricing mass
transit. In the context of urban auto travel, two dis-
tortions other than underpriced auto congestion are
particularly important: income taxation and agglom-
eration externalities. The substitution effect of the
income tax distorts the labor-leisure choice decision,
encouraging leisure. Since labor is a complement to
travel on the journey to work, raising the price of
rush-hour auto travel through congestion tolling
exacerbates the labor-leisure distortion.The current
empirical wisdom is that this effect is quantitatively
important (Parry and Bento 2002).
The nature of agglomeration externalities and how
they relate to traffic congestion requires more expla-
nation. It is widely believed that many of the pro-
ductivity benefits from the spatial agglomeration of
economic activity derive from non-market interac-
tion and are external to the individual firm (Fujita
and Thisse 2002).Each firm has a horizontal margin-
al cost curve, and the curve falls the greater the
amount of non-market interaction. Because the
amount of non-market interaction increases with
city population size, the marginal product of labor
exceeds the average product. And because the
agglomeration benefits are external to the individual
firm, workers are paid the average rather than the
marginal product. Thus, the market generates insuf-
ficient interaction. Since people need to travel to
interact, congestion pricing would exacerbate this
distortion unless toll revenues were spent in ways
that neutralize this effect. No one has attempted to
quantify the importance of this effect,9 but it could
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7A related issue is technological standardization.On one hand,the
best technology and the best congestion pricing system to employ
depend on city size and local conditions; for example, Schöb (this
issue) argues that, because of its simplicity, a multi-mode ticket,
that charges drivers entering the city center a fee equal to the bus
fare, is a promising policy for small cities. On the other, a prolifera-
tion of congestion pricing systems will lead to technological incom-
patibilities that will make the treatment of out-of-towners more
difficult.
8 London decided to employ a reliable, low technology system.The
license plates of all cars driving within the charging zone are pho-
tographed and compared to the license plates of cars for which the
fee has been paid.Violators are then sent warnings or are fined.
9 Because non-market interaction does not, by its nature, leave a
paper trail, its importance can be inferred only indirectly. The
degree of returns to scale to population can be inferred from cross-
city differences in wages. But the effect here is more subtle, entail-
ing holding population constant and measuring the elasticity of
interaction with respect to the cost of transportation.CESifo DICE Report 3/2005 9
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be substantial. Taking both income taxation and
agglomeration economies into account could result
in second-best congestion tolls being so low that the
benefits from even the best congestion-tolling
scheme would be more than offset by implementa-
tion costs.
Alternatives to congestion pricing
Urban transport policy making used to be dominated
by planners and engineers. Economists stood on the
sidelines waving the banner of “congestion pricing”.
But times have changed. Planners and engineers are
better trained in economics than they were a genera-
tion ago and, through an accumulation of evidence
and frustration at the inability of traditional policies
to stem congestion,are coming to recognize that pric-
ing has an important role to play in the efficient man-
agement of urban traffic.They are therefore far more
receptive to economists’ ideas than they used to be,
and economists are playing an increasingly important
role in urban transport policy debates. Now that
urban transport economists are getting more en-
gaged in policy decisions, they need to develop a
more balanced and sophisticated view of urban traf-
fic management. Congestion pricing by itself is not
enough. What is needed is a balanced portfolio of
policies, which includes both congestion pricing and
the policies traditionally favored by engineers and
planners, as well as novel policies that have been un-
justly neglected because they do not fit neatly into
the disciplinary conceptualizations of the urban
transportation problem. Urban transport economists
should also recognize that they can contribute to
improving road traffic management policy in many
ways other than advocating congestion pricing.
Building our way out of the problem
The approach of traffic engineers in the 1960s was to
build our way out of the problem, by constructing
more and better-engineered freeways, highways and
roads.The standard cost-benefit rule employed was to
expand capacity when the discounted value of travel
time savings from doing so exceeds construction costs.
Application of this rule results in efficient choices
when prices are right.10 But urban auto travel was sub-
stantially underpriced.11 In this situation, application
of the standard rule results in too much capacity. To
see this, consider the effects of an incremental road
expansion. If traffic flow is fixed at the pre-expansion
level, the expansion reduces congestion and trip price,
inducing additional drivers to use the road. The
increase in flow that accompanies an increase in capa-
city is known as latent demand.With underpriced con-
gestion, trip price is below marginal social cost. The
marginal social benefit from these additional drivers
using the road is simply the trip price. Thus, the addi-
tional drivers who use the road add to the deadweight
loss due to underpriced congestion, which dissipates
the benefit from the road expansion. Latent demand
therefore weakens the effectiveness of road building
in reducing traffic congestion when congestion is un-
derpriced12 but not when it is properly priced. Traffic
engineers should therefore support congestion pricing
since it renders road construction more effective.They
should also welcome economists’ expertise in cost-
benefit analysis and in the analysis of irreversible
investment decisions under uncertainty (Dixit and
Pindyck 1994).
Upgrading existing infrastructure
Confronted by strong opposition from environmental
and neighborhood groups and faced with sky-rocket-
ing land costs, traffic engineers have been pushing
road building in already built-up areas less strongly
and are now emphasizing expanding capacity through
upgrading existing infrastructure. Here too econo-
mists can contribute valuable advice.13 Traffic engi-
neers’ current fascination with vehicle information
systems seems to me somewhat misguided, but again
economists have a role to play in emphasizing that
more information is better when the prices are right
but not generally otherwise – congestion pricing and
vehicle information systems are complements too.
10 This can be intuited by imagining the adjustment to an incre-
mental capacity expansion as occurring in two steps. In the first,
flow is held fixed;in the second,flow adjusts to its new equilibrium
level.The welfare gain from the first step is simply the value of trav-
el time savings to existing drivers.The welfare gain from the second
step is the net social benefit from the increase in traffic flow, or
alternatively the net social benefit associated with those drivers
who choose to travel after the capacity expansion but not before.
The social benefit associated with each of these drivers is the pri-
vate benefit or trip price; the social cost is simply marginal social
cost. Since these are equal under Pigouvian congestion pricing, the
additional welfare gain in the second step is zero.
11 Not only was urban auto congestion directly unpriced but it was
also indirectly subsidized. The excessive suburbanization resulting
from underpricing urban auto travel was further encouraged by
paying for suburban infrastructure out of general revenue. Most
parking was provided free as well, and in the United States the
price of gasoline was set below the world price.
12 In the basic model, the proportion of the benefits dissipated
through latent demand depends on the same two elasticities that
determine the magnitude of the deadweight loss due to under-
priced congestion, the demand elasticity and the elasticity of pri-
vate congestion costs with respect to traffic density. On a network,
latent demand can be so serious that the addition of a link can have
negative gross benefits (the Braess Paradox; Braess 1968).
13 In designing roads, traffic engineers draw heavily on design stan-
dards. These design standards are often drawn up on the basis of
inferior statistical analysis, are rarely informed by economics and
tend to be applied without consideration to traffic conditions.
Economists have an important role to play in rationalizing the
choice and application of design standards.Encouraging alternative modes of travel
Environmentalists and planners have their own
favored remedies. One is to encourage alternative,
“less wasteful” modes of transportation, another to
alter land use patterns in a way that reduces the
amount of travel. Economists often find themselves
at odds with planners; economists favor prices, plan-
ners regulations; economists favor consumer sover-
eignty, while many planners seem eager to impose
their vision of the good life on the citizenry. Never-
theless, many of the policies that planners advocate
merit inclusion in the policy cocktail,and economists
can offer useful advice on how these policies can be
more effectively designed. If pricing were efficient,
governments making capacity decisions based on
first-best rules, together with individuals making de-
cisions based on full prices, would result in full effi-
ciency. But since pricing is not efficient, in particular
since car travel is underpriced, sound economic ar-
guments can be made for encouraging travel by
modes that generate less distortion. In most Euro-
pean cities, schemes to promote bicycling (Arnott,
Rave and Schöb 2005, Ch. 3) and the high levels of
transit subsidies are probably justified.In the United
States, the pricing sins of the fathers have been visit-
ed upon the sons. The heavy subsidization of auto
travel in the decades after World War II resulted in
suburbanization at densities too low for mass transit
to be viable. Because of their preoccupation with
congestion pricing and auto travel, urban transport
economists have rather neglected mass transit; it is
time that imbalance was redressed.
Encouraging higher density and more mixed land use
Planners,especially the new urbanists,are advocating
policies to increase densities and to mix land uses.
Land use regulation to promote higher densities
reduces the amount of travel but that travel is slower
and more congested.Land use regulation to mix uses
has the beneficial effect of getting people to walk
rather than drive on short trips but is unlikely to have
a major impact on traffic congestion. Because their
training is so suitable, urban economists can con-
tribute far more than they have done to policy issues
at the intersection of transportation and land use.
Parking policy
There are many promising congestion alleviation
policies that have been neglected because they do
not fall neatly into the domain of economics, engi-
neering or planning. One is parking policy.14 Here
there are vast, untapped efficiency gains. While the
right level of second-best congestion pricing is much
contended, it can confidently be asserted that pro-
viding free or nearly-free on-street parking in heavi-
ly-trafficked areas is grossly inefficient.The full price
of on-street parking has two components, the park-
ing fee and the cost of time spent cruising for park-
ing. Consider the situation with no off-street park-
ing.15 The full price of on-street parking is deter-
mined by the intersection of the parking demand
curve and the parking availability constraint.Raising
the parking fee has no effect on the full price but
simply replaces time wasted cruising for parking
with parking fee revenue. There is the additional
benefit that reducing cruising for parking reduces
traffic congestion; the revenue is therefore raised
with negative burden! 
Freight delivery management
Another area in which potentially huge efficiency
gains can be achieved is urban freight delivery man-
agement. Oversized trucks block traffic when back-
ing into loading docks and get stuck negotiating
turns on narrow streets;vans block traffic when dou-
ble parking to deliver a small package. Freight deliv-
ery would contribute far less to congestion if it were
required that all deliveries be made by vans in the
morning hours, and if during these hours some curb-
side were restricted to van deliveries.
Outside-the-box policies
Other, outside-the-box policies should be explored.
Since it is the value of time lost due to congestion
that matters, congestion costs can be reduced by
making driving more pleasant;16 traffic noise,a curse
of life in many urban areas, can be reduced by man-
dating quieter cars;urban road construction,a major
contributor to non-recurrent congestion, can be
done at night under sound-absorbent tents;17 the
time loss due to road accidents, another major con-
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14 Donald Shoup, a planner trained as an economist, is an excep-
tion.He has done excellent work documenting the high social costs
of subsidizing parking (Shoup 2005).
15 With off-street parking as well, the same argument goes through
but with the modification that the full price of on-street parking is
determined by the off-street parking rate rather than by the inter-
section of the parking demand curve and the parking availability
constraint.
16 Improved car audio systems and the expanded range of talking
books have already contributed to this.
While reducing congestion costs associated with a given volume of
traffic and level of capacity, making driving more pleasant will also
stimulate demand and increase the deadweight loss associated with
underpriced congestion.
17 This is already done in London.CESifo DICE Report 3/2005 11
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tributor to non-recurrent congestion,can be reduced
by introducing no-fault insurance and immediately
towing the cars involved in an accident; and aggres-
sive driving, that not only greatly impedes traffic
flow but also makes driving considerably more dan-
gerous and less pleasant, can be discouraged by
equipping all new cars with electronic devices that
monitor horn-honking, frequent lane changes, tail-
gating, etc.
Conclusion
Urban transport economists are entering a brave new
world in which – finally, after fifty years of crying in
the wilderness – urban congestion pricing schemes
may become commonplace. On one hand, I look for-
ward to seeing what schemes are put in place and how
well they do, and sincerely hope that urban conges-
tion pricing proves to be worth the wait.On the other,
I have my doubts that urban congestion pricing will
be as effective as most other urban transport econo-
mists believe. Whether or not my doubts prove well
founded, city tolls are only one element of an effec-
tive policy cocktail for dealing with urban traffic con-
gestion. Urban transport economists should broaden
their horizons beyond congestion pricing to give due
attention to the myriad other congestion-relief poli-
cies whose effectiveness can only be improved by the
application of sound economics.
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